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Abstract
Mitigating an Energy Utility Death Spiral in the United States: Applying Lessons from
Germany
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The purpose of this paper is to present evidence that the United States is entering a "Utility Death
Spiral" - a dramatic shift away from the utility based model of electricity supply to consumers. It also
explores how U.S utilities can reposition themselves to best mitigate the economic losses associated
with a Death Spiral. A Utility Death Spiral is currently taking place in Germany called the
"Energiewende" and it is having immediate impacts on its energy landscape. The case study of the
Energiewende is presented, its impacts, and the response taken by the country’s “big four” utility
companies. After analyzing the German utilities, recommendations are made that inform how U.S.
utilities should organize to mitigate potential impacts of a Death Spiral here in the U.S.
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1.0 Introduction
The energy landscape that the United States is currently operating in may come
to see a swift and dramatic transition from conventional energy generation. Because of
the rise of renewable distributed energy resources (“DER”), the economic viability of
conventional energy generation systems (coal, natural gas) are deteriorating rapidly.
Consumers generating their own electricity can sell their excess electricity generation
back into the grid for profit and those who do not generate excess can draw
supplementary electricity from renewable sources at a lower cost than from traditional
energy generation sources. Cost savings and environmental consciousness are two
major draws towards DER; however, a third draw is discovered when DER is paired with
energy storage. Excess energy generated during off-peak hours can be stored to be
used during peak hours when demand spikes. This addresses one of the major draw
backs from renewable energy generation which is intermittency and unreliability. Now
solar energy generated during the day can be stored and used during the night and
wind energy can be used when there is no wind.
As states start to reach grid parity, which is when the cost of renewable energy
generation becomes equal to, or less than the cost of conventional energy generation,
there are more economic incentives for customers to move away from conventional
utilities and towards DER. Currently, 20 states including Washington, DC have reached
grid parity and it is estimated that by 2020, 42 states will have reached that
breakthrough (Munsell, 2016). As the number of states continue to reach grid parity
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and the number of customers to utility companies leaving for DER increases, the
demand for conventional energy generation drops significantly. This forces the utility to
raises their prices of their rates to those who are still connected to their grid to be able
to cover their fixed costs (Costello and Hemphill, 2014). These fixed costs include grid
maintenance and maintenance of their power generating facilities. Even though
volumetric energy consumption is down and fewer customers are utilizing the utility’s
grid system, the cost of maintaining the grid infrastructure remains the same as well as
costs to maintain their PP&E (property, plant, and equipment). As rates for customers
connected to the grid rise, they are increasingly incentivized to disconnect from the grid
and move towards DER, typically in the form of rooftop solar. This in turn forces the
utilities to again raise their rates to continue to be able to cover their fixed costs which
again drives more customers towards DER. This vicious circle is what is known as the
“Utility Death Spiral” (The Economics of Grid Defection, n.d., para. 9). In this article, I
will be attempting to determine whether a Utility Death Spiral in the United States will
threaten current utility business models and if so, what changes may need to be made.
The Utility Death Spiral is a very important issue that deserves much attention
from both the energy provider as well as consumers of electricity of both conventional
and renewable energy sources. Even though people are moving towards distributed
energy in droves away from traditional utility companies, we still need these utility
companies as they play an essential role in the industry. It is very possible that in the
event of a Death Spiral, many electric utility companies may go bankrupt and no longer
generate or distribute energy. Because utilities own the grid infrastructure that they
2

transmit energy through, who will be responsible for maintaining the grid if a utility
ceases to exist? Will third parties step in to maintain it? In November of 2016, the utility
industry employed approximately 565,200 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). If we
were to experience a Utility Death Spiral, thousands of jobs could be lost due to the
collapse of these established electric utility companies. The US economy could
potentially see a spike in unemployment rate and a deterioration of the grid system if
we let them go under. The Death Spiral would have serious implications on lower
income families and communities who may not be able to afford the initial upfront costs
to purchase solar panels and the ancillary technology needed to tap into the distributed
energy network (Passera, 2015). It becomes even more difficult as their rates begin to
increase, lowering their amount of disposable income that otherwise could be put
towards renewable energy technology (Passera, 2015).
In 2010, Germany began its very own energy transition known today as the
Energiewende. This effort is focused on driving Germany towards a more dependable,
affordable, environmentally comprehensive energy landscape that relies heavily on the
implementation of renewable energy; mostly wind, solar, and biomass. This energy
transition implemented by the German government and supported strongly by the
German citizens, has brought about Germany’s own, self-induced Utility Death Spiral.
Since then, we have come to see major changes in the business models of some of the
country’s largest energy providers with varying degrees of success.
In this article, I will be conducting a case study analysis on Germany’s
Energiewende and the responses from many of the country’s leading electric utilities. I
3

will be looking at the actions that many of electric utilities in Germany have taken and
formulate actions that U.S. electric utilities can take to mitigate potential losses incurred
by a Utility Death Spiral. A Utility Death Spiral has never happened before in the United
States and has only been theorized by some industry experts (Costello and Hemphill,
2014); however, if the Death Spiral in Germany is any indication of the severity of what
might happen in the United States, then the US electric utilities need to form
contingency plans to respond to such an event.
•

Is there a trend towards Distributed Energy?

•

Could a Utility Death Spiral threaten current US utility’s business model?

•

What actions can be taken by US utilities to mitigate losses of a potential
Utility Death Spiral?

2.0 Methods:
For this analysis, I will be taking a comprehensive look at the energy revolution
taking place in Germany and the effects that it has had on the major electric utility
companies operating in the country. After analyzing the effects that the Energiewende
has had on the utilities that are operating business as usual, I will look at the response
from each company. This information will allow me to identify which responses were
the most effective at mitigating the economic damages caused by policies. I will use
these responses to formulate recommendations that I believe electric utilities in the
United States should consider adopting in the likelihood of a Utility Death Spiral in the
country.

4

3.0 Findings and Discussion
3.1 Trend Towards Distributed Energy Resources
Over the past few years, the United States has started to see a very strong trend
towards distributed energy generation for both residential and commercial consumers
of electricity. Between 2009 and 2014, the US saw the installed solar PV capacity
(MW/year) grow 1,066%, including a 1,350% increase among just residential solar (The
Economics of Load Defection, 2015). During the same time, the cost of installing
residential rooftop solar fell from $8.2 to $4.5 per watt. This is dramatic decline of 45%
over just a 6-year span (Economics of Load Defection, 2015).
This has led to a new era of choice and empowerment in regards to how
individuals produce and consume their electricity. For many years, the major barrier to
rooftop solar energy generation was the initial cost of the equipment and their
installation. Now that DERs are become much more affordable, it has had three major
implications. 1) DERs are now more economically viable for consumers who desire to
obtain their energy from renewable sources. 2) The significantly lower cost has
dramatically increased the breadth of consumers that may now be able to afford DERs.
3) Has made a case for DERs to be a better economic choice over conventional energy
generation due to high cost savings and quick pay back periods. This becomes a strong
force behind the expansion of DERs once a state reaches grid parity. If the estimations
made by Musell prove to be accurate, by 2020, 42 states in the US will have reached
grid parity. This means that it will be economically preferable to implement DERs in
84% of the states in the US in just the next 3 years.
5

3.2 DERs Paired with Energy Storage
In-home storage units are essential for DERs to operate at maximum efficiency.
This is because without energy storage facilities, all electricity generated must either be
used immediately or sent back into the grid to be used elsewhere. This becomes
problematic during peak hours of demand for electricity. As seen in Figure 1, peak
demand typically is around 6:30 pm when individuals begin to return home for the night
and start to electronics and appliances in their households. Even though a household is
utilizing DERs, during this peak time they may not be able to generate the needed
electricity to meet their energy demand needs. This may be because the sun is not out
or there is no wind to generate the energy. This offsetting of energy demand and
energy generation will force that specific household to turn to the utilities to
supplement the needed energy. The utilities meet the spike in demand through the use
of quick start energy generation plants, also known as Peaker Plants (St. John, 2014).
These Peaker Plants typically only operate for a few hundred hours per year, with the
sole purpose of meeting the peak energy demand. Due to market mechanisms, they are
guaranteed revenue streams so that they may be built (Lin, Damato, 2010). This causes
the price per kW to be much higher for Peaker Plants than it is at power plants that
operate continuously to meet the base load electricity demand. This means that DERs
not paired with in-home storage will find it very difficult to become completely
independent from the utilities.

6

Figure 1: Electric Load Curve: New England, 10/22/2010
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on data from Independent System Operator New England

While in home energy storage is essential for independence from the utility
companies, it continues to be one of the largest barriers preventing DERs from
overtaking conventional utilities as the preferred form of energy generation. This is
because of the steep cost of purchasing and implementing an in-home battery.
Currently, the most advanced in-home energy storage unit is Tesla’s Power Wall 2.0.
With a base price of $5,500 and a storage capacity of 13.5-kW, it is highly unaffordable
for many households in the United States. Consumers could also opt for the older model
of Power Wall which costs $3,500 with a 7-kW capacity (Tesla Power Wall: the
complete review, 2016). This is cheaper; however, not nearly as cost effective.
7

While today, the cost of in-home energy storage is very high, there is much hope
in the energy community that we will begin to see a rapid drop in the cost of this
technology. Over the next 5 years, there is going to be an estimated 47% decrease in
the total cost for lithium-ion storage technology (Labrador, 2016). With the introduction
of new technology and more competition in the storage market, it is easy to see the
price of storage be driven down significantly in the near future. Many companies
currently working to develop cheap, affordable energy storage units predict that they
can provide a unit for less than $100 per kWh which is 1/3 of the current average cost
per kWh. It is predicted that both GM and Tesla could reach $100 per kWh by 2020
(Wesoff, 2016).
3.3 Germany’s Energiewende
Energy systems globally are entering a period of transformation. The European
Union has set forth ambitious goals to drive towards a low-carbon economy and fully
integrated energy markets. G7 countries established back in 2015 that they would push
to fully decarbonize their power systems, and China has recently become the largest
market for renewable energy in the world. Germany is playing a very strong role in this
global energy transformation by adopting what is probably the most radical and
ambitious energy program of any industrialized nation in the world. They have come to
call this effort, the Energiewende. The term “Energiewende’ literally translates into
“Energy Transition”, and that is exactly what Germany is attempting to do. Though it
had been in the planning phase throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s, it was implemented
in 2010, just 6 months before the Fukushima nuclear reactor accident. Germany plans
8

to use solar and wind power as the foundation of this energy transition to establish the
Energiewende as a long-term energy and climate strategy with goals as soon as 2020
and as far out as 2050. I have separated the Energiewende into 2 different segments
highlighting each of the targets that the Energiewende is attempting to address.
The first target, which has the staunchest support from the public is their nuclear
phase-out plan which has been called for ever since the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster in
1986. Up until March of 2011, Germany obtained 25% of their energy from the 17
nuclear reactors operating in the country (World Nuclear Association, 2016); however
due to strong public opposition to this form of energy generation, the nuclear phase-out
plan became a staple of the Energiewende. Since 2011, Germany has decommissioned
9 of their reactors, dropping their total production of energy from nuclear down to 16%
of the country’s consumption (World Nuclear Association, 2016). It is Germany’s goal to
have the 8 remaining nuclear reactors decommissioned and phased-out by the end of
2022 (The history behind Germany’s nuclear phase-out, 2015). The plan is that while
they continue to phase out nuclear energy generation in the country, they will replace
that energy generation capacity with newly implemented renewable energy, which
leads us to the next target of the Energiewende.
The second target of the Energiewende is its efforts to increase the total energy
generation obtained from renewable sources. The long-term goal set by Germany is to
obtain 80% of the electricity generation to be sourced from renewables by the year
2050. Due to how far out 2050 is, Germany has set intermediate goals to be met along
the way. This includes a 35-40% share of renewable energy generation by 2025 and
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55-60% by 2035 (Energiewende Goals, 2016). The majority of the renewable energy
generation will come in the form of solar and wind. Between the year 2000 and 2015,
Germany raised their renewable energy consumption from 6.5% to 31.6%
(Energiewende: What do the new laws mean?, 2016). This has all been accomplished
through the construction of several off-shore and on-shore wind farms as well as rapidly
dropping cost for on-site solar energy generation for both commercial and residential
properties. Initially, the Energiewende had implemented a feed-in tariff system as an
incentive for consumers to produce their own electricity and sell it back into the grid for
profit; however, in 2014, they replaced the feed-in tariff for a tender system. This new
system of selling renewable energy operated like an auction, ensuring fair market price
is paid for the energy. As you can see in figure 2, these efforts have made significant
impacts in the amount of renewable energy sources installed in the country. You can
clearly see an upward trend in the amount of renewable energy sources installed each
year, starting in 2011, one year after the implementation of the Energiewende. In 2016,
of the country’s 194.1 GW power generating capacity, 101.5 GW is sourced from
renewable energy sources equating to 52.3% of the total capacity.
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Figure 2: Installed Net Power Generation Capacity in Germany 2002-2016 Source: EIA.Gov

The third target of the Energiewende is improved energy efficiency so that they
may start to lower the energy consumption of the entire country. With a short-term
goal to reduce their energy consumption by 10% by 2020, relative to their 2008 levels
of consumption. Their long-term goal is to reduce their consumption by 25%, also
relative to their 2008 levels (Goals of the Energiewende, 2016). Germany is reaching
these goals through improved energy management systems including in-home
automation like smart meters and smart thermostats similar to the Nest thermostat
currently in the market. In addition to this, Germany has also implemented higher
standards for buildings in regards to energy efficiency and consumption. This is highly
prioritized over other sectors like transportation and industry because residential homes
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account for approximately 40% of the total amount of energy consumed in Europe. Of
this 40%, 85% is used for heating and cooling of homes (Energy efficiency made in
Germany: Buildings, 2016). This is a very large portion of Germany’s and all of
Europe’s energy consumption making it low hanging fruit for the Energiewende to focus
on in order to meet their 2020 and 2050 goals.
3.4 Impacts the Energiewende on German Electric Utilities
The ambitious goals set forth by the Energiewende has had very immediate and
significant impacts on the electric utilities operating in Germany. Germany’s market
share of electricity generation is dominated by 4 major utilities as seen in figure 3. It is
important to note that Vattenfall is actually a Swedish utility company; however, has
one of the largest energy profiles in Germany. Making up approximately 72% of the
total market, these 4 utilities have realized major losses due to the energy transition. In
2013 alone, RWE lost $3.8 billion (Lacey, 2014). In the same year, Vattenfall saw losses
of $2.3 billion for similar reasons as RWE (Lacey, 2014). In 2015, the nation’s largest
energy provider, E.ON reported a loss of €7 billion ($7.7 billion) which was more than
double than their losses from the year before (Andresen, 2016). These major losses
have been attributed to the companies cycling down many of their fossil fuel based
power plants due to their unprofitability because of shrinking wholesale prices of
electricity (Lacey, 2014). Because the German government is prioritizing the
development and advancement of wind and solar, the wholesale price of conventional
electricity generation has plummeted. As the country attempts to increase the
penetration of renewable energy as well as reduced electricity demand due to energy
12

efficiency efforts, the baseload generation from conventional energy generation quickly
created of surplus of energy to be sold. This has driven down the price of the electricity
from this source, making it nearly impossible to profit from. On June 16th, 2013, the
wholesale price for electrcity actually fell to minus €100/MWh (European Utilities: How
to lose half a trillion euros, 2013). This means that these utilities were actually having
to pay consumers to take the electricity that they were generating at the time. In 2013,
Germany saw the wholesale price go negative for 64 hours during the entire year
(Understanding the Energiewende Imprint Background, 2015). Due to the inflexability
of conventional energy generation, this makes fossil fuel energy generation riskier as
renewable energy gains more traction in the country.

Figure 3: Germany’s electric generation profile
Source: Deloitte Consulting Services
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3.5 Reaction by the “Big Four” Utilities
The nuclear phase-out had by far the most significant, immediate impact on the
German utility companies than anything else. All 17 nuclear power plants in the country
were operated by one of the “Big Four” utility companies who also had significant
equity stake in the plants that they operated, and in some cases, total ownership of the
plant. The net generating capacity of all 17 plants totaled 20,339 MWe, which is lost by
the four utilities. Currently, Germany has shut down 10,728 MWe generating capacity in
9 power plants (World Nuclear Association, 2016). The utilities, in attempts to recover
both revenue and generating capacity in a short amount of time have increased their
burning of coal. This however, is not a long term soulution for the utility companies as
many of the utilities have released statements that they are commited to phasing out of
coal as well. For right now, as renewable energy infrastructure is being built, these
utilities have turned to the fossil fuel to fill the gap.
E.ON, which at one point in time was Germany’s largest electric utility had
arguably the most dramatic response to the implementation of the Energiewende.
Realizing that they could no longer operate business as usual, the company decided
that an major restructuring of their business model was needed. E.ON decided to split
their copmany into two different companies. Since January of 2016, E.ON separated
their conventional power plant operations and all of their assets associated with
conventional energy generation into a newly ceated company, Uniper (E.ON, 2016).
Uniper will be taking control of 42 GW of generating capcity as well as E.on’s midstream gas (storage, transportation, ect…) (Reid, 2016). Uniper will be controlled
14

majorily investors of E.ON. This is because for every 10 shares of E.on owned, the
investors will receive 1 share of Uniper and will control approxiately 53.35% of the
company (Reid, 2016). E.ON will control the remaining 46.65% of Uniper (Reid, 2016).
It seems that E.ON has passed on the burden of conventional fossil fuel energy
generation onto their investors. E.ON will now focus solely on renewable energy
generation and grid maintenance, electricity distribution networks, and customer facing
projects such as smart energy metering (Vasagar, Clark, 2015).
RWE has been hit the hardest as result of the Energiewende. Their stock price
was listed at €12.40 per share, becoming the worst performing stock of 2015 on the
German Stock Index (DAX), losing half of their value (Vasagar, 2015). This is because
of their heavy dependence on fossil fuels for energy generation coupled with very little
investment in renewable energy technology. 93% of their energy generation is sourced
from fossil fuels as well as nuclear while renewable energy only accounted for 4% of
their generating capacity (Michel, 2015). Conventional energy generation accounted for
22% of the company’s operating profits while renewables only accounted for 4.2%
(Michel, 2015). In 2014, 45% of RWE’s conventional power plants were operating at a
loss (Michel, 2015). This inability to generate profit coupled with the fact that many of
the company’s power plants are over 30 years old, nearing the end of their lifespan,
RWE should expect that many of their power plants are to be decomissioned in the very
near future. Understanding this, RWE has decided, just like many of their competitors
to dramatically shift their business to create a new “prosumer” business model. They
plan on creating this new business model in similar fashion as E.ON, which is a split of
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the company but with one major difference. That is that E.ON’s spin off contained all
the conventional energy operations and assets while RWE’s contains all their new
renewable energy aspirations. RWE will retain majority share of the company while
selling 10% of the equity to investors to raise capital to further their investment into
renewable energy. Thomas Hechtfischer, director of Deutsche Schutzvereinigung fuer
Wertpapierbesitz shareholder association, said “RWE sells the future, EON sells the
past” (Andresen, 2016). This is much more attractive to investors than in Uniper, E.ON’s
spin off company. RWE plans on rapidly increasing their investment into “off” and “on”
shore wind, and solar energy generation up from the low 4.2% to 20% of their portfolio
by 2020; however, at the time, it had yet to be determined whether or not this will be
enough to turn the company’s momentum around. RWE CEO, Peter Terium stated that
they may have been “possibly too late” investing in renewable energy (Vasagar, 2015).
This spinoff of RWE has initially shown to be very successful. In 2016, RWE’s stock rose
17% since the spinoff, becoming the second best perfomer in the DAX during that time
period.
After losing an astonishing $2.3 billion in 2013 attributed to the Energiewende,
Vattenfall has been looking for ways to change their business model in attempts to
avoid another year like 2013 and rebound in a positive way. Completed in mid 2016,
the company successfully sold of all of their assets, liabilities, and provisions associated
with their lignite operations in Germany. This includes all of their lignite run power
plants equaling 8,000 Mw in generating capacity, coal mines, and all costs associated
with the decomissionning of the plants and the repurposing of the land (Andresen,
16

Bauerova, Magnusson, 2016). Vattenfall was able to sell all of this to Energetický a
průmyslový Holding (EPH) which is an energy company based out of the Czech
Republic. In total, Vattenfall was able to sell of their assets for $1.8 billion while saving
approximately $2.2 billion in liabilities that were also taken on by EPH (Andresen,
Bauerova, Magnusson, 2016). By cutting ties with coal energy generation and taking all
of the assets and liabilities off of their books, they have freed up a signifiacnt amount of
resources to shift their focus to renewable energy technologies. This deal is also
supposed to drop Vattenfall’s carbon emissions to below 25 million tonnes per year
from the 80 million tonnes per year that they were emitting in 2015 (Bellon, 2016).
Along with Divesting entirely from coal and lignite, Vattenfall has also begun investing
$3.4 billion into German cities including Berlin. They have been focusing on the
development of renewable energy, district heating and decentralized energy schemes
within the targeted cities. Although Vattenfall has not specifically stated which
renewable energies that they will be investing in and to what extent, they have come
out and stated their optomistic support for the growth of wind energy within the
country. Outside of their operations in just Germany, Vattenfall has plas to grow their
global wind generating capacity by 600 Mw per year as well as invest €5 billion nto
renewable electricity generation over the next 5 years (Vattenfall, 2016)
EnBW, with the same realization that they could not continue to operate
business as usual decided to take drastic efforts of their own. They plan on shifting
their business to focus on renewable energy, grid operations, and customer facing
technological development. Instead of spinning off a segment of their company, EnBW
17

decided to undergo large scale divestment. The company has came out and stated that
they plan on divesting from conventional energy generation by 80% by 2020 (Lacey,
2016). This comes in the wake of the nuclear phase-out which is forcing EnBW to shut
down their plants which accounted for over half of their energy generating capacity
(Andresen, 2015). In total, they plan on selling of $3.4 billion in assets, and with 6
power plants already sold by September of 2015, they are well on their way to
achieving their goal (Andresen, 2015). This includes assets linked with both fossil fuel
energy generation as well as nuclear energy generation. They intend to replace this loss
in generating capacity with the development of renewable energy, more specifically,
wind. They plan to have 40% of their installed generating capcity to be from
renewables by 2020 (Andresen, 2015). The company is setting themselves up for long
term future success with their aggressive investment into offshore renewable energy
generation. With 336 MW of wind capacity installed between 2 facilities, they have an
additional 1,700 MW of generating capacity in planning (Andresen, 2015). This places
EnBW far ahead of any of their compeitors in regards to wind energy generation. Of all
the responses to the Energiewende, EnBW’s may have been the best of the “big four”
compnaies. This is because since EnBW formulated and began implementing their
proposed changes, they have seen the smallest negative impact on the company’s
value. This is very significant knowing that they had over half of their generating
capcity invested into the soon to be gone nuclear energy. Since the implementation,
EnBW saw its stock value drop 13% which when compared to E.ON’s 25% drop and
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RWE’ 54% drop as seen in figure 4, is a very positive sign for the company (Andresen,
2015).

Figure 4: EnBW’s Stock performance since strategy implementation
Source: Bloomberg News

4.0 Shifting United States Energy Landscape
4.1 New Direction
With the new Trump administration now in power, we are looking at a radical
shift in the federal energy policy relative to the direction that the Obama administration
was driving towards with the implementation of the Clean Power Plan (CPP). So far in
the first days of Trump’s administration, we have very little clarity in what is going to
happen; however we do know the direction that we are headed towards. The only
official release on the future energy landscape of the United States is the brief
19

statement released on the White House website titled “An American First Energy Plan”.
In this statement, the new administration makes unsubstantiated claims that by
repealing Obama’s Climate action Plan would increase the wages of the American
worker by over $30 billion over the next 7 years. This number is derived from another
unsubstantiated claim that we will be able to raise these wages by tapping into the $50
trillion worth of shale, oil, and natural gas reserves. The administration plans on
accessing these reserves by opening up federal land “that the American people own” for
drilling and extraction (Whitehouse.gov, 2016). By increasing our supply of fossil fuels,
the price of energy generation would expect to drop significantly for residential and
commercial customers as well as generate increased profits for the working American.
To support this decision to give coal a second chance, the administration said that they
will embrace clean coal technologies in the form of carbon capture & storage (CCS).
Lastly, the brief states that the United States will strive to achieve energy independence
from the “OPEC cartel”. This will be achieved by our new found love of fossil fuels and
increased extraction in the years to come. From this information that the
administration has provided, what is the outlook for a possible utility death spiral now
looking like in the United States, and how does it affect the electric utilities?
We can expect to see federal support for renewable energy all but disappear in
the coming months, including the popular 30% tax credit; however, there is reason to
believe that on the state level, the support will be stronger than ever, effectively driving
renewables forward. States like New York and California are going above and beyond to
make renewable energy a significant part of their state’s economy in the future. It is
20

safe to conclude that the states are not just doing this because of their responsibility to
protect the environment, but also it is economically the best decision. As stated earlier
in the paper, more than half the states are expected to reach grid parity in the next few
years, meaning it wil be cheaper to source their energy from renewable sources than
from fossil fuels. Detailed below are states that are taking extraordinary steps to
support renewable energy.
4.2 New York
The state of New York is pushing through with their revolutionary policy titled
Reforming the Energy Vision (REV). The purpose of this action plan is to take full
advantage of all the cost saving and energy security benefits brought about by
renewable energy. This reform took off after superstorm Sandy hit, prompting New
York State to rethink their energy systems. The goals of this initiative have 3 main
objectives. The first being reducing their green house gas emissions by 80% from 1990
levels by 2050. This effort spans across power generation, transportation, industry, and
buildings. The second main goal is to reduce the energy consumption from buildings
relative to 2012 levels by 23%. This equates to roughly 600 trillion BTU’s in energy
saved from this efficiency effort. The third and most ambitious goal of NY REV is
sourcing 50% of their energy from renewable energy sources by 2030 (Reforming the
Energy Vision, 2016). This initiative has been so successful that between 2012 and
2015, the state saw an increase of 575% in solar (NYSERDA, 2016). Although wind
energy generation plays a very small part of New York’s energy economy (2.6%) (NY
Department of Environmental Conservation, 2016), the state just announced that they
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will begin construction of the countries largest wind farm off the coast of Long Island.
Renewables are not just surviving in the state, New York has made it a place where
they can thrive and flourish.
4.3 California
The state of California, known for their ambitious environmental policies, has
unsuprisingly set extraordinary energy policies in place for the future. The most
noteable of them is their Renewables Portfolio Standards (RPS) which is to push the
state’s energy mix towards renewable energy. When first implemented in 2002, the
goal was to have 20% of California’s retail energy be sourced from renewables by year
2010. This was attainable by requiring all retail sellers of electricity to source 20% of
their energy from renewable sources. This initiative has since taken off and has been
built upon ever since. Currently, the initiative stands at a goal of 50% renewables by
2030 (California Renewable Energy Overview & Programs).
4.4 Massachusetts
Massachusetts has been a leader in renewable energy progression for some time
now. Their aggressive approach to renewable enrgy generation, solar in particular really
took off in 2008 beginning with Global Warming Solutions Act. This act set in place
goals for the state to reduce their GHG emissions by 25% by 2020 and 80% by 2050.
They plan on reaching this goal through channels including renewable energy
installation, energy efficiencies, and even urban development to create more walkable
communities (Mass.gov, 2016). Although Wind has gone relatively ignored by the state,
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their installed solar energy capacity is impressive as shown in figure 5 with 1,465 Mw of
installed capacity to date since 2008. To date, Massachusetts is ranked 7th in regards to
installed solar capacity.

Figure 5: Massachusetts Installed Renewable
Source: Mass.gov

4.5 United States as a whole
In total, 29 states and three territories have set forth mandatory RPS legislation.
The most ambitious being Hawaii aiming for a 100% renewable energy portfolio by
2045 and the smallest being South Carolina aiming for a 2% portfolio share by 2021
(State Renewable Portfolio Standards & Goals). While federal support for renewable
energy is nearing the end in place for coal, many states have taken it upon themselves
to establish market penetration for these energy sources. On top of the 29 states and
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territories, 8 states and 1 territory have set forth voluntary renewable enrgy goals
meaning that compliance is not required or enforced but merely suggested. In all, only
13 states (26% of all states) and 1 territory have no plans in place to promote
renewable energy generation.
4.6 New Trump Administration
With the new incoming administration prioritizing coal and other fossil fuels, one
could initially believe that this is a huge hit for the growth of renewable energy. When
you breakdown all the ambitions loosely layed out on the Whitehouse website, you can
pick it apart and find that there are reasons to be very optimistic for the future
renewable energy economy. Starting with the revival of coal as our primary source of
energy, the United States has been gradually shutting down large amounts of coal
generated energy capacity. In 2015, 80% of all retired energy generating capacity in
the U.S. was from coal, amounting to nearly 14GW of production (EIA, 2016). Over the
past several years, coal has been losing its share of generating capacity. Much of this
decline has to do with increasing competition with natural gas energy generation as
well as the fact that the fleet of coal plants are nearing the end of their life. Most coal
power plants were built between 1950 and 1970 and those that are still in operation,
surviving 2015’s closures, are well beyond their 40 year life expectancy according to the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Comissioners. According to the EIA, in 2013,
74% of the coal power plants in the united states were older than 30 years, making
almost two thirds of the our country’s plants nearing retirement. In 2015, 95 coal power
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plants were shut down and another 41 shut down in 2016 adding up to a total of
approxiamely 18.8825 GW of generating capacity (Fitzpatrick, 2016).
President Trump, in planning his revival of coal, has not taken into account the
costs that are going to be associated with having to buid new plants due to the current
state of the aging plants. The average cost to build a coal power plant is more
expensive now that it has ever been and is expected to become even more expensive in
the future. It costs an average of $4,586/kW to construct a modern coal fired power
plant with 30% carbon sequestration, an essential piece to President Trump’s energy
plan. A plant with 90% sequestration would cost an average of $5,072/kW (EIA, 2017).
As these costs are just the projected costs of constructing these plants, actual costs
that we are realizing from current plants being constructed today are much higher. The
recent construction of the Kemper Power Plant in Kemper County, Mississippi is a
perfect example of this. Owned by Mississippi Power, the plant which was proposed in
2009 with a budget of $2.4 billion; however after countless delays and setbacks, the
plant is now $3.9 billion over budget and 2 years behind schedule pushing the
completion date back to 2016. Even to this day, the plant is not fully operational. the
unexpected high cost of implementing the CCS technology has had profound impats on
the company as well as the taxpayers. This one plant alone threatened to bankrupt
Mississippi Power. The cost to construct this one power plant was more than all of the
company’s assets combined. All together, the cost per kWh came out to be about
$10,000. This forced the company to turn to their own customers to recover as much of
the cost as possible. This resulted in an 18% rate hike for all of Mississippi Power’s
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customers. In end, the Kemper power plant is designed to capture 65% of the carbon
released from its power generation. While CCS is in fact capturing and storing carbon,
at a rate of 65%, this makes the Kemper power plant equivalent to a natural gas plant
(Biello, 2015).
While this cost per kWh was for a brand new plant with the addition of CCS
technology is very high; retrofitting current coal powered plants has proven to be even
less cost effective. The Boundary Dam power plant in Saskatchewan spent $1 billion to
retrofit one of their three coal-fired boilers in 2014. This worked out to be roughly
$11,000 per kWh of generating capacity, more than the Kemper power plant. This cost
is also three times as much as a typical boiler. Due to the regulatory nature of the
electric utilities, they are able to recoup costs incurred by raising the rates on their
customers. When taking these costs and applying to the rest of the country’s coal-fired
power plants, this would equate to an increase of roughly $0.04 increase per kWh, an
increase of 33% from the national average of $0.12 (Biello, 2015).CCS is simply not a
feasible option. There have been several attempts to implement the technology;
however, the success rate of the projects is a dismal 31%. With 15 CCS projects
operating globaly and 7 in the planning phase, there have been 33 failed CCS projects
since 2010. Even if coal is brought back, the cost associated with the CCS technology
will ultimately sink the efforts.
The worst case scenario for renewable energy generation, which is also the best
case scenario for coal energy generation, would be the elimination of the Mercury and
Air Toxic Standards (MATS) legislation. This rule limited that amount of mercury, acid
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gases, and other harmful pollutants that a coal-fired power plant was allowed to emit
into our atmosphere. This ruling, even though it only applies to pollutants that have a
generating capacity at or above 25 megawatts, has been responsible for the closing of
several coal-fired power plants over the years since 2011 when it was implemented.
This ruling has placed great pressure on the utilities to comply with the standard,
forcing them to weigh the costs and benefits of what it would take for their plants to
meet the standard. In many cases, it was more cost effective for them to simply shut
down the plants. In total, it has been estimated that the total cost incurred on the
utilities is approximately $9.6 billion annually (Ross, 2012). This ruling has caused 4.7
gigawatts of generating capcity to be planned for closure from coal power plants by
2015 (Ross, 2012). This ruling, before President Trump’s administration came into
office, has been under intense scrutiny. Implemented by the supreme court by a result
of 5-4, there is a good chance that with the new supreme court justice Gorsuch, that
there is little the EPA can do to keep MATS in place. Former Justice Scalia, a strong
republican ally in the supreme court criticized the ruling (and the EPA) for not taking
into accounts the costs incurred on the utility companies when trying to comply with the
standard. Scalia did mention that he did not believe that the EPA overstepped its
bounds when implementing the ruling. If this ruling were to be overturned and the
regulations put in place on the utilities were longer, there would suddenly be a large
incentive to open up more coal power plants in the United States. This however is no
guarantee that coal power plants will suddenly experience a strong revival. The EPA
signified that the MATS would speed up the pace that coal plants would be shutting
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down, meaning that even without the ruling in place, coal plants will still find
themselves gradually going off line but not at the rate caused by the MATS.
5.0 Recommendations
After analyzing the state of DERs in the United States, the impacts of the
Energiewende and the responses taken on by each of the big four German utilities, I
have established several recommendations that electric utilites in the United States
should begin to think about adopting in the face of a potential Death Spiral taking place
in the United States. The first recommendation, fashioned after RWE and E.ON’s
decision to spin of their companies into two seprate entities. Interestingly, E.ON sold
majority stake of their spinoff company, Uniper to investors, passing off much of the
burden onto them. While they are selling of equity in Uniper, they are growing what is
left of E.ON which is focused on renewable energy generation. This is the action that I
recommend. It will allow US utilities to focus more on renewable energy ventures while
increasing capital from selling equity of the spinoff company focused on conventional
energy generation. This has been a proven response as it has resulted in RWE
becoming the second best perfoming stock on the DAX in 2016. It is important to note
that RWE responded late to the Energiewende restuling in their major loss in stock
value; however since their spinoff company, they have rebounded quickly.
My second recommendation comes in three parts. The first part is that the
utilities should divest completely from fossil fuel energy generation. This includes all
assets and liabilities associated with the process of generating electricity from
nonrenewable sources. This is especially import to consider early on before a Death
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Spiral begins to take place because of the devaluation of these assets once they begin
to be unprofitable. While these assets including plants, resources and mines are
retaining their value and in some cases may even be increasing in value due to the
Trump Administration’s announcement of the America First Energy Plan. The second
part of this recommendation is that the capital gained from the selling off of these
assets and liabilities should be quickly reinvested into DERs and consumer facing
technologies. This will lower the utilities fixed costs by moving away from long term and
costly power plants and towards mutliple sources of energy generation and demand
response options when paired with storage. This allows for increased flexibility in the
face of a shifting energy landscape, especially if a death Spiral were to occur. The third
part which is to restructure their rates, moving away from fixed monthly charges which
are used to cover a utility’s fixed costs, and move towards more volumetric charges that
will cover a utilties variable costs; which would now make up the majority of the utility’s
costs. To the consumer, their utility bill would drop the fixed, flat rate charge and
simply add onto their volumetric charge through an increased rate. All together, this
recommendation alows for the utility to be more felxible in the face of a Death Spiral.
No longer locked into conventional energy generation due to their long term
investments into power plants, they are able to mitigate financial losses.

29

6.0 Bibliography
Alanne, K., & Saari, A. (2006). Distributed energy generation and sustainable development. Renewable
Energy and Sustainable Energy Review.
(2016). An America First Energy Plan. Washington: Whitehouse.gov.
Andresen, T. (2015). EnBW to Fund Green Power Switch With $3.4 Billion Asset Sale. Bloomberg News.
Andresen, T. (2016). Energy Provider EON Posts Record Net Loss of €7 Billion in 2015. Bloomberg News.
Andresen, T. (2016). RWE Split Favored Over EON's in German Utilities Overhaul. Bloomberg.
Andresen, T., Bauerova, L., & Mangus, N. (2016). Sweden Clears Sale of Vattenfall’s German Lignite
Plants to EPH. Bloomberg News.
Appunn, K. (2015). The history behind Germany's nuclear phase-out. Clean Energy Wire.
Appunn, K. (2016). Germany’s energy consumption and power mix in charts. Clean Energy Wire.
Appunn, K. (2016). Germany’s greenhouse gas emissions and climate targets. Clean Energy Wire.
Bellon, T. (2016). Vattenfall to invest 3 billion euros in Germany: CEO | Reu. Reuters.
Biello, D. (2015). The Carbon Capture Fallacy. Scientific American, 58-65.
Bronski, P., Creyts, J., Crowdis, M., & Doig, S. (2015). THE ECONOMICS OF LOAD DEFECTION HOW GRIDCONNECTED SOLAR-PLUS- BATTERY SYSTEMS WILL COMPETE WITH TRADITIONAL ELECTRIC
SERVICE, WHY IT MATTERS, AND POSSIBLE PATHS FORWARD THE ECONOMICS OF LOAD
DEFECTION. Boulder: Rocky Mountain Institute .
(n.d.). California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs. State of California.
(2015). Coal made up more than 80% of retired electricity generating capacity in 2015 . Energy
Information Agency.
Costello, K., & Hemphill, R. (2016). Electric Utilities' 'Death Spiral': Hyperbole or Reality? The Electricity
Journal.
(n.d.). Distributed Energy Resources. Electric Power Research Institute .
Durkay, J. (2016). State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals. National Conference of State
Legislatures.
E.ON, S. (2016). Spin-off of Uniper Group. E.ON.
EIA. (2017). Cost and Performance Characteristics of New Generating Technologies, Annual Energy
Outlook 2017. EIA.Org.
(2017). Energiewende: What do the new laws mean? Agora Energiewende.
(2017). Energiewende: What do the new laws mean? Agora Energiewende.
(2016). Energy Efficiency made in Germany - Buildings. Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy.
30

EPA, U. (n.d.). Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS).
EPA, U., OAR, OAP, & CPPD. (n.d.). Distributed Generation of Electricity and its Environmental Impacts.
Environmental Protection Agency.
European utilities: How to lose half a trillion euros. (2013). The Economist.
Fitzpatrick, J. (2016). Coal Plants Are Shutting Down, With or Without Clean Power Plan. Morning
Consultant.
(2016). Goals of Energiewende. Agora Energiewende.
(2016). How Fixed Charges Harm Customers. Consumer's Union.
(2016). Industries at a Glance: Utilities: NAICS 22. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Lacey, S. (2014). This Is What the Utility Death Spiral Looks Like. Greentech Media.
Lin, J., & Damato, G. (2010). How Storage Can Help Get Rid of Peaker Plants. Greentech Media.
(2016). Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA). State of Massachusetts.
Michel, J. (2015). RWE's struggle with the Energiewende. Energy Post.
Munsell, M. (2016). GTM Research: 20 US States at Grid Parity for Residential Solar. Greentech Media.
(2016). Nuclear Power in Germany. World Nuclear Association.
(2008). Number of employees at U.S. utilities. Statista.com.
(2016). NYSERDA. New York: NYSERDA.
Passera, L. (2015). Spreading the Solar Cheer: Reaching Low-Income Customers. Interstate Renewable
Energy Council.
(n.d.). Reforming the Energy Vision (REV). State of New York.
Reid, G. (2016). Maybe the worst is behind Uniper. What about E.ON? Energy and Carbon.
Ross, B. (2012). EPA’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) Rule and States . The Council of State
Governments.
St. John, J. (2014). Dueling Charts of the Day: Peaker Plants vs. Green Power . Greentech Media.
(n.d.). Tesla Powerwall: What Buyers Need to Know. Energy Sage.
(2016). THE ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION WHEN AND WHERE DISTRIBUTED SOLAR GENERATION
PLUS STORAGE COMPETES WITH TRADITIONAL UTILITY SERVICE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Boulder:
Rocky Mountain Institute .
(n.d.). Understanding the Energiewende Imprint Background. Agora Energiewende.
Vasagar, J. (2015). RWE plans IPO of its business focused on renewable energy. Financial Times.

31

Vasagar, J., & Clark, P. (2015). Germany’s green goals have profound consequences for Eon and RWE.
Financial Times.
Vattenfall. (2016). Vattenfall’s wind power operations. Vattenfall.
Wesoff, E. (2016). How Soon Can Tesla Get Battery Cell Costs Below $100 per Kilowatt-Hour? Greentech
Media.
(2016). Wind Power. State of New York.

32

